POLS 429: International Terrorism Lecture 28 (04.06.2020): Counter - Terrorism

Rotem Dvir

Texas A&M University rdvir@tamu.edu

Department of Political Science Spring 2020

Overview

- Quick review
- 2 Introduction
- Measuring CT Success
- 4 CT Methods
- 6 Extra Material

Review

What we covered last meeting?

- Financing: identifying the most effective way to move money to support terror operations.
- Assessing methods of financing: volume, risks, costs.
- Methods: couriers, informal systems as Hawalas, money services businesses and banks, false trade invoices, charities.
- The terror-crime nexus: incentives for terrorists and criminals.
- Cooperation in weak states with large *shadow economies* (Afghanistan and Pakistan).

Questions??



Introduction

- Main puzzle \rightarrow which CT policy is more successful than others?
- Main research question: why do CT measures work in some cases and fail in others?
- Variation among states:
 - Type and amount of measures.
 - How discriminate are the policy actions?
 - Do measures target specific perpetrators/suspects or entire populations that are alleged to support terrorism?

DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND

- Counter-terrorism: the practice, tactics, techniques, and strategies by which various arms of the state combat or prevent terrorism.
- A top-down approach, independent or joint actions:
 - Military force and law enforcement.
 - Intelligence agencies.
 - Political offices.
 - Community groups and private sector members.
- **History**: Irish Special Branch (ISB) → Britain (1880s).
- ullet 9.11 o CT as a top (global) national security issue.



Counterinsurgency?

- Counter-terrorism and Counterinsurgency (COIN).
- COIN: military, political, economic, psychological, civic and other actions to protect the population and restore the legitimacy of the government.
- CT Post-9.11: intelligence efforts, prevent financial flow and a host of defensive measures.
- COIN Post-9.11: eradicate threat, removal of Taliban and establish a new government that will be more capable of preventing terrorism.
- Similar overall objective, different means.



- **Success**: crucial to assess CT effectiveness given the enormous increase in budget.
- Challenge: the CT campaign involves multiple measures, focusing on different goals (radicalization, prevention, post-attack, etc.).
- Research on counter-terrorism breaks down questions of effectiveness based on 4 broad categories (reflect the objectives).

(1) Reduce attacks and damages

- Objective → decrease the number of attacks and damages (property, casualties).
- CT measures → protect specific locations (airports, embassies), or counter specific perpetrator group.
- Repressive vs. conciliatory policies in Canada (1985-2013):
 - Aggressive policy (domestic more restrictions, global joining the coalition attacks in Afghanistan): increase in extremist attacks.
 - Since 2010, combination of strategies reduces attacks.
- Curbing attacks in US: 80% foiled (full or partial), mostly due to internal information.



(2) Destroy Terror groups

- Objective → increase the likelihood of a group's demise or shifting its focus from violence.
- CT measure → Leadership decapitation.
- Demise: inactive or resume activities within a 2-year period after killing its leader (Jordan 2009).
- Smaller and younger group are more vulnerable to decapitation while religion based organizations are more resilient.
- Overall, only 17% of the cases show decline.
- Decapitation is less effective when the goal is to end the group's tenure.



(2) Destroy Terror groups

- Price (2012): the importance of how we conceptualize and measure success.
- Rejects the 2-year time lag; adopt a longer time frame to analyze groups' mortality rate.
- Findings: leader decapitation increases the mortality rate.
- Religious groups are less resilient and easier to destroy than nationalist ones.
- When decapitation happens early, its success chances are higher.
- Any type of *leader turnover* increase the likelihood of group's demise → more CT alternatives.



(3) Containment

- Objective → restrict groups' actions to a specific locality, type or technology.
- CT measures that prevent access to (and use of) CBRN weapons.

(4) Normative Values

- ullet Objective o maintain core values facing terrorism threats.
- Trade-off: successful in thwarting an attack but harms norms and values that a society cherish.

Source: Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley 2006

Airport screening	Emergency preparedness	Prison building
Anti-terrorism home products	Foreign aid	Psychological counseling
Arrests	Embassy fortification	Punishment/sentencing
Assassinations	Gas mask distribution	Religious interventions
Bilateral agreements	Hostage negotiation	Situational crime
Blast-resistant luggage	Investigation strategies	prevention
Building security	Legislation (e.g., Patriot Act)	UN conventions
CCTV	Medical antidotes	UN resolutions
Community/NGO initiatives	Media efforts	Vaccinations
Weapons detection devices	Metal detectors	War (counterinsurgency
Diplomacy	Military intervention	
Educational programs	Multilateral agreements	

TABLE 13.2 Examples of Counterterrorism Strategies, Tactics, and Programs

Airport screening em herre products Anti-terre

Arrests

Assassinations

Bilateral agreements Blast-resistant luggage

CCTV

Community/NGO initiatives

Weapons detection devices

Diplomacy

Educational programs

Emergency preparedness Foreign aid

Embassy fortification Gas mask distribution

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Media offerte

Metal detectors

Military intervention Multilateral agreements

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UN resolutions Vaccinations

prevention

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THE PROPERTY AND PARTY.

Bilateral agreements

Blast-resistant laggage **Building security**

CCTV

Community/NGO initiatives Weapons detection devices

Diplomacy

Educational programs

Emergency preparedness Foreign aid Embassy fortification Gas mask distribution Hostage negotiation Investigation strategies

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Vacciniations

- Most research is not encouraging:
 - Fortification and punishment are ineffective.
 - Military intervention increase attacks in short-term, has no clear long-term effects.
 - UN actions are ineffective.
 - Ochanges in political context is suggestive and uncertain.
- Ethical-practical trade-offs: CIA, fake vaccinations in Pakistan and searching for Bin laden.
- Negative effects: global health programs, western health workers targeted (9 dead in a 2010 attack).

Unpack methods: hard vs. soft power

- **Hard power**: deploy tangible sources (military/police forces) to attack and deter terrorists (and their supporters).
- Enemy centric doctrine: isolating and destroying terror groups.
- CT tools → drone strikes, military intervention, increased policing and intelligence operations.
- **Soft power**: indirect tools to address terrorism.
- Population centric methods: target the underlying enabling causes of terrorism.
- CT tools → capacity-building initiatives, stem finances, economic development and countering radicalization.

Indiscriminate repression

- Objective → impose costs on perpetrators, and offer benefits to those that abstain from violence.
- A central aspect: coercion and punishment.
- Rational perspective: high costs from terrorism and deterrence.
- Deterrence: discriminate or indiscriminate policy.
- Example: Israel house demolitions during 2nd Intifada.
- Discriminate actions \rightarrow deter further terrorism.
- Repressive indiscriminate actions backfire (population view actions as illegitimate).



Indiscriminate actions

- Mass surveillance.
- The global war on terror and public perceptions of these methods.
- More invasive actions: collecting fingerprints for any visitors and immigrants to the US, additional private information.
- \bullet Criticism \to damages to civil liberties and normative costs. Why?
- Government is responsible to ensure citizens' privacy rights and freedom even facing threats of terrorism.

Indiscriminate actions

- Main indiscriminate policy → Military intervention.
- Logic (9.11): preempt the global reach of terrorism, and eliminate their resources.
- Evidence of effectiveness is highly questionable: the onset of the Global War on terrorism increased global attacks by 74%.
- This is the **escalatory effect** of military interventions.
- The Abu-Ghraib prison controversy (Iraq, 2003-04).

DISCRIMINATE REPRESSION

- Targeted Killings/Leadership decapitation.
- Problems with evidence:
 - No systematic studies with general conclusions regarding effectiveness.
 - ② Different measures of effectiveness → influences subsequent assessments.
- Successes: the demise of the Shining path (Peru) and PKK (Turkey) → leaders were captured, not killed.
- Unsuccessful? AQ and the killing of Bin-Laden.
- ullet Effectiveness o organizational structure.
- Hierarchical versus decentralized network structure.



DISCRIMINATE REPRESSION

- The extended use of armed drones (UAVs).
- How to distinguish between suspects and non-combatants?
- Effectiveness: multiple costs (Cronin 2013).
 - Further alienation of populations abroad.
 - ② Did not interrupt recruitment, planning and training of terrorists by the global network.
 - Violation of human rights and national sovereignty of states.
- Byman (2013): effective in curbing attacks by denying sanctuary to perpetrators and killing prominent leaders.
- Other benefits: low cost, precision weapons that reduce civilian casualties.



Recommended readings

More studies on Terrorism financing:

- Patrick B. Johnson, "Does Decapitation Work?: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," *International Security*, Vol. 36, Issue 4 (2012), pp. 47-79.
- ② Jenna Jordan, Margaret E. Kosal, and Lawrence Rubin, "The Strategic Illogic of Counterterrorism Policy," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 2017), pp. 181- 192.
- Jason K. Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (June 2009), pp. 331-362.






Figure 13.3 Plots Foiled by Intervention Type;

Source: START (Crenshaw et al. 2016)