POLS 318: Theories of IR Lecture 15 (10.08.2020): Alliances, institutions and international treaties

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Overview

- Quick review
- Military Alliances and War
- Other aspects of military treaties
- Political Economy treaties
- 5 Extra Material

WHAT WE COVERED LAST MEETING?

- International treaties.
- Types and ratification process.
- Compliance reciprocity and reputation.
- Credible commitment.
- Types: environment (private actors).
- Types: Human rights.
- Types: Laws of war (strategy, not norms).

Questions?? Email me!



Security and Treaties

Background

- Important rule in interactions (war, peace).
- Alliances and defense pacts.
- Peace agreements, territorial boundaries.
- Laws of war (self-enforcing).

Compliance

- Rational view → credible commitment issues.
- Treaty signals intent to comply.
- Alliances \rightarrow signal of military assistance.



Definition

• Written agreement between two/more independent states, promises aid in case of conflict.

Types

- Defensive cooperation.
- Offensive cooperation.
- Neutrality.
- Non-aggression.
- Consultation.



Do alliances reduce the risks of war?

The content of alliance agreements

- Important aspect in understanding the commitment.
- ullet Agreement type o a signal to both members and rivals.
- Shapes calculation of initiating attacks.


Information and Intentions (Leeds 2003)

- Main challenge → credible commitment in alliance.
- Information about future intentions.
- Incentives for behavior.
- Sunk costs (forming an alliance) or anticipated reputation costs (failure to fulfill obligation).
- Costs → information is reliable.

Types & Obligations (Leeds 2003)

- Mutual defense pact a deterrent effect.
 - Both parties promise active military support.
- Neutrality pact SevenWeeksWar
 - Nonintervention under certain conditions.
 - Encourage aggressive intentions (no opposing coalition).
- Offensive pact enhance aggressive intentions.

Military Alliances and War



• Data: alliances and conflicts among dyads (1816-1944).

Military Alliances (Johnson 2015)

Seeking a bargain


- Concessions required when seeking an ally.
- Weaker states.
- Treaty content → characteristics of signing actors and their rivals.

Alliance tradeoffs (Johnson 2015)

- Strong state seeks concessions for a treaty.
- How alliance changes the relative power relations?
- Bargaining game: target state and its (potential) ally.

The Shadow of external threat \rightarrow extent of concessions

Alliance concessions MhatAffects




Arms control treaties

- ullet Main objective o ban the use of certain weapons.
- Reduce the chances of dangerous arms races.
- Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1970)



The NPT





Arms control and arms race

NPT

- Limits the spread of nuclear weapons?
- Ratification \rightarrow less proliferation.

Maybe not helpful?

- **①** Strategic selection: no intentions \rightarrow ratify NPT.
- ② Institutional weakness: benefits of development ≫ costs of violations (lax enforcement).

Arms control and arms race

NPT

- ullet Focus on process o ratification of treaty.
- Compare ratification process in other areas (arms, immunity, human rights, communications).
- Also estimate the likelihood of keeping the NPT commitment.
- Findings: NPT \rightarrow positive effect on curbing spread of nuclear weapons (1970-2000).



International Treaties


Economic policy - FDI

- How do international treaties affect economic policy actions?
- BIT Bilateral Investment Treaties.
- Host state (developing country) and external investor (FDI).
- How does it work?
- Commitment to respect property rights and protect investors.
- Legal mechanism to settle disputes potential costs for reneging.



International Treaties

• BITs - allow autocrats to attract FDI.



BITs and FDI

Why? (Chen and Ye 2020)

- Leaders' view of their expected political survival.
- How long will my regime last?
- Future secure? \rightarrow sign BITs.
- Enjoy benefits of FDI but accept the limitations (cannot intervene in projects or nationalise them).


BITs and FDI

Time Horizons

- Perception of remaining time in office.
- Regimes democracy vs. dictatorship.
- FDI → dictatorships, time horizons?
- Long term view: no threat \rightarrow benefits \gg costs of BIT.
- Short term view:
 - Political survival uncertain incentives to violate.
 - Why? use foreign revenue to co-opt rivals and secure coalition.

BITs and FDI

Dictator's perception of survival



International Institutions

Economic international organizations

- Why join an international organization?
- Endorse free trade: reduce global tariffs, incentives for economic integration.
- Benefits: MFN status, greater access to global markets.
- Data is mixed membership is not certain to increase trade flows.

International Institutions

WTO - World Trade Organization

- The role of the institution accession to the WTO.
- Multiple rounds of inquiry, require reduction in restrictions on free trade.
- ullet More rigorous process o greater policy change and potential benefits.
- More scrutiny more liberalization of the economy and more benefits.

World Trade Organization

44 WTO members issue joint statement affirming WTO support



Source: Joint statement of the 44 WTO members (December 11, 2017), www.wto.org



WTO - World Trade Organization

Better trade flows? (Allee and Scalera 2012)

- Focus on process requirement and duration.
- Findings:
 - Automatic process no trade benefits.
 - 2 Tough accession greater trade benefits.
 - More benefits in the ST.
- Implications:
 - Political 'cover' for cutting protection policies.
 - Evidence for effectiveness of WTO and global trade flows.


Recommended readings

More studies on international treaties and institutions:

- Digiuseppe, Matthew, and Paul Poast. (2018). "Arms versus democratic allies." British Journal of Political Science 48, 4, 981-1003.
- Berkemeier, Molly, and Matthew Fuhrmann. (2018). "Reassessing the fulfillment of alliance commitments in war." Research & Politics 5, 2, 1-5.
- **3** Tucker, Todd. (April 2019) "The WTO just blew up Trump's argument for steel tariffs", *The Monkey Cage blog (Link)*



Neutrality Pact



What affects concessions?

How number of concessions change?

