POLS 318: Theories of IR Lecture 14 (10.06.2020): International Treaties

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Overview

- Quick review
- 2 Introduction
- Treaty Elements
- Treaty Areas
- **5** Conflict & International Treaties
- 6 Extra Material

Review

What we covered last meeting?

- Economic statecraft: sanctions and foreign aid.
- Sanctions compel change in behavior.
- The winning coalition and regimes.
- Deprivation or Backlash effects (Israel).
- Foreign aid in exchange for policy concessions.
- Why fail?
- Dictators and aid.

Questions?? Email me!



Introduction

- Basics: definition, types.
- Motivations to sign.
- Motivations to renege.
- Treaties and international institutions.

DEFINITION

- Formal agreement b-w sovereign states.
- Multi or bilateral agreements.

Famous Treaties



Main elements

- Create legal obligations.
- Promote custom behavior derived from practice.
- Not all treaties are binding!

BINDING TYPES

- Hard law: legally binding. Reduce transaction costs of future interactions.
- ② Soft law: suggestive and custom based. More likely when negotiation costs are high.

Ratification

- ullet Treaty ratified o binding.
- However...
- Ratification is not a must.
- Rules vary by states.
- The process and procedures of ratification: signal for behavior (compliance or violation).

Self-enforcing agreement

- Common type of international treaty.
- Based on rational view.
- No third party to enforce → self-enforced.
- How does it work?
- The signing parties \rightarrow cost-benefit of treaty.
- Gains from agreement ≫ costs of abrogation.
- "Enforced" by parties themselves (control the benefits).

Mechanisms of Enforcement

Reciprocity

- ullet Compliance o positive and negative incentives.
- Positive: cooperation over the long-run.
- Negative: fear of retaliation and setting a bad precedent.
- Prisoner's Dilemma Game
- Examples:
 - Stable trade relations.
 - 2 No conflict: respond militarily in-kind.

Mechanisms of Enforcement

Credible Commitment

- Compliance and risks of reneging.
- ullet International agreement o reduce reneging risks over the long-run.
- How? Costs to strengthen treaty credibility:
 - 1 Ex ante (sunk) costs: signal of commitment.
 - 2 Ex post costs: paid in case of violations.
- Ex post costs mechanisms: arbitration, prosecution, dispute settlement.

Mechanisms of Enforcement

Reputation

- ullet Compliance o secure reputation.
- Clear costs in case of violation.
- Law as a top priority, accepted by all members.
- Empirical evidence: public reject violating behavior.
- Support for reputation mechanism of treaty.
- Yet conditions may alter views (elections, partisanship).
- Other problems: unobserved behavior, future not valued highly, domestic incentives drive system behavior.



Treaty Enforcement

Domestic incentives

- Appease public → violate international treaty.
- Treaty \rightarrow information to citizens.
- Public support for norms of compliance and rule of law.
- Violation \rightarrow political risk for government.

Liberal democracies: 'better' with international treaties

Treaty Enforcement

Domestic incentives

- ullet Treaty o group mobilize and demand compliance.
- Ratification \rightarrow legitimacy, link to identity.
- Attracts media attention, recruitment of allies.
- Treaties of human rights: civil, women, children, etc.
- Yet, regime type matters...
 - Stable autocracies no mobilization.
 - Stable democracies no motivation.
 - Partial and transitioning democracies.

Direction of causality - driven by domestic pressure or international conditions?



Treaty Compliance

A constructivist view

- ullet Compliance o social norms of laws.
- Public discourse on legitimacy shapes behavior.
- Beliefs and values are critical.
- A socialization process...

Treaty Compliance

A constructivist view

SOCIALIZATION PROCESSES:

- Ocercion/conditioning: rewards/punishments system for elites.
- Acculturation: cues of socially accepted behavior that fit international standards.
- Persuasion: deliberation to alter attitudes, values and identity. Push for compliance with treaty.
 - Empirical evidence? still a problem.

Environmental Regulations

- Transparency is critical for compliance.
- ullet Treaty design o incentives for polluters.
- What must government do?
 - Capacity to implement complex regulations.
 - 2 Constrain private actors.
 - Use positive and negative inducement for compliance.

Environmental Regulations - private industries

Deepwater Horizon Explosion - 2010





Environmental Regulations - private industries

Deepwater Horizon Explosion - 2010



Environmental Regulations Treaties

Support mechanisms

- Union labors and local ports → fight against violations.
- Prominent role for NGOs.
- Civil society can support compliance.
- Empirical evidence: NGOs and corporate interest mediation.
- \bullet Non-business actors \to increase compliance of multilateral international agreements.

Human Rights Treaties

Why different issue?

- Importance.
- No reciprocity → a design problem.
- Hard to sustain as self-enforcing.
- Mostly nonmaterial issues: theoretical and normative emphasis.



ARTICLE 13 — Right to free movement in and out of the country.

ARTICLE 14 — Right to asylum in other

countries from persecution.

ARTICLE 30 — Freedom from state or
ARTICLE 15 — Right to a nationality and the
freedom to change it.



ARTICLE 28 — Right to a social order that articulates this document.

ARTICLE 29 - Community duties essential to free and full development.

Human Rights Treaties

- Persuasion and promotion of appropriated behavior.
- Internalized legally and as norms.
- Requires ratification for legitimacy and effect.
- Example: repressive regimes and the CAT treaty.
- Motivation: co-opt competition so ratify agreement.
- Yet, no international enforcement mechanism.
- Ratification \rightarrow expressive only.

Types

- Important rule in interactions (war, peace).
- Alliances and defense pacts.
- Peace agreements, territorial boundaries.
- Laws of war (self-enforcing).

Security and Treaties

Compliance

- Rational view \rightarrow credible commitment issues.
- Treaty signal for intent to comply.
- Alliances \rightarrow signal of military assistance.
- Data: most alliances are kept (reputation costs).

Why violations?

- Change in relative power among actors.
- Change in domestic institutions.
- Forming a new, external alliance.



Security and Treaties

The Laws of war (Valentino et al. 2006)

- Do states that ratify treaties comply with laws of wars in conflict?
- Do armies target civilians?
- Ratifying "Laws of war" treaties.
- War strategy correlate with targeting civilians.
- Ratified treaty \rightarrow no effect.
- Strategic incentives \gg legal and normative considerations.
- Potential indirect effect on chosen strategy (avoid certain costs).




Recommended readings

More studies on international treaties:

- Carnegie, Allison, and Austin Carson. (2018). "The Spotlight's Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order." *International Organization* 72, 3, 627-657.
- Jensen, Nathan M., and Edmund J. Malesky. (2018). "Nonstate actors and compliance with international agreements: An empirical analysis of the OECD anti-bribery convention." *International Organization* 72, 1, 33-69.
- Marchiori, Carmen, Simon Dietz, and Alessandro Tavoni. (2017). "Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 81, 115-131.

Cooperate or Defect?



for many real world situations.