

POLS 318: Theories of IR
Lecture 7 (02.10.2021):
Domestic Politics in IR

Rotem Dvir

Texas A&M University

rdvir@tamu.edu

Department of Political Science
Spring 2021

Overview

- 1 Quick review
- 2 Domestic Politics in IR
- 3 Domestic Politics - Applications
- 4 Extra Material

Review

WHAT WE COVERED LAST MEETING?

- Liberal theory - cooperation, not competition.
- State preferences drive behavior.
- Norms promote cooperative behavior.
- Liberal regimes and coordination.
- Theory of Interdependence (trade policy).
- State preferences complement realist views.

Questions?? Email me!

States are no 'black boxes'

BACKGROUND

- Early research views on dynamic within states.
- Linkage politics (1960s).
- No longer a unitary actor - theory and reality.

IR is not "high politics", domestic institutions systematically shape self-interested leaders' choices, thus affecting the global politics.

The Two-level game

A framework to study global interactions

- International bargaining and 'dual-pressure'.
- Domestic groups interests.
- Other states demands.
- Policy choice as a 'double-edged sword' (Free trade).

The Two-level game

ORGANIZATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

- Agreement subjected to internal ratification.
- Two-level as a constraint.
- Levels are not independent.

"Win-sets"

- Win set size and successful bargains.
- Domestic win-set size and strategic interactions.

The Two-level game

WIN-SETS

(1) Distribution of preferences and power in level 2

- Costs of failure and role of status-quo.
- Isolationists and internationalists within level 2.
- Diverse domestic views of international agreement.
- Multiple issues - more complex.

The Two-level game

WIN-SETS

(2) Political institutions

- The ratification process.
- Diverse and complex procedure → smaller win-set.
- Official versus unofficial ratification.
- Decision makers degree of independence.

(3) Level 1 strategies

- Large win-sets: strategic benefits and costs.

The Two-level game

MORE IMPLICATIONS

- Uncertainty → worse outcomes.
- Heterogeneity of domestic views and agreement.
- Synergistic issue linkage.
- Paradox of domestic strength and global outcomes.
- International events → domestic viewpoint.

Domestic Institutions in IR

Government Coalition and Conflict

- Stability and government survival.
- International conflict → risk increases.
- The dilemma of defection:
 - ① Opportunity costs.
 - ② Transaction costs.
- High costs → more secure government.

Domestic Institutions in IR

Coalition and conflict

- *Critical events* - increase risks for survival.
- Political scandals, wars, economic crises.
- How?
- Alternative government coalitions.
- Prevent 'critical events' → shorter conflicts.

Domestic Institutions in IR


Main factors

- Partisanship: right-wing more competent in security affairs.
- Government structure.
- Diversity of ideology.
- Election timing.

Method

- Data: 588 military disputes (1945-1992).
- 20 Democratic states.
- Domestic and international indicators.
- Survival analysis.

Conflict duration



Domestic Politics and War

Government survival and war

- Public opinion.
- Parliament support (US congress - Johnson 1964; Bush 1990).
- Domestic strength → use of force.
- Type of institutions. [▶ DomesticInst.](#)

Domestic Politics and War

International Conflict (Auerswald 1999)

- The choice to use military force: US, UK, France.
- Comparing cases: Suez (1956), Bosnia (1995).
- Case study method.
- The scientific value: same context, variation in institutions.

The Suez Crisis (1956)



The Suez Crisis (1956)



Recommended readings

More studies on Domestic politics in IR:

- 1 Williams, Laron K. "Flexible election timing and international conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 57, 3 (2013): 449-461.
- 2 Schneider, Christina J., and Branislav L. Slantchev. "The domestic politics of international cooperation: Germany and the European debt crisis." *International Organization* 72, 1 (2018): 1-31.
- 3 McManus, Roseanne W., and Keren Yarhi-Milo. "The logic of "offstage" signaling: Domestic politics, regime type, and major power-protégé relations." *International Organization* 71, 4 (2017): 701-733.

Government Institutions and Conflict Behavior

Domestic institutional type	Accountability: Selectorate with power to threaten office tenure	Agenda control: Freedom from legislative interference in conflict or coercive diplomacy decisions	Likelihood of executive initiating armed conflict or making threats
All regime types before an election	Electorate	Variable (as listed below)	Low—very low (depending on agenda control)
Coalition parliamentary governments	Majority in Parliament	Partial agenda control	Low
Domestically weak pure-presidential and premier-presidential governments	Minimal (except in highly unusual circumstances)	Partial agenda control	Medium
Majority parliamentary governments	Majority party in Parliament	Total agenda control	Medium–high
Domestically strong pure-presidential and premier-presidential governments	Minimal (except in highly unusual circumstances)	Total agenda control	High