POLS 318: Theories of IR

Lecture 23 (04.07.2021):
Territorial Disputes - the Motivations

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Motivations for Disputes

- Quick review
- 2 Political consequences
- Motivations for Disputes
- 4 Extra Material

Review

Quick review

What we covered last meeting?

- Proximity, interactions and territoriality.
- An issue approach territory as central issue.
- Issue salience tangible/intangible values.
- Salient territory and military action.
- Outbidding, regimes and territorial wars.
- Diversionary war the issue of territory.

Questions?? Email me!

Territorial conflicts

Political ramifications

- Positive effects (rally around the flag).
- "Don't let them die in vein".
- Risks from conflicts the culpability of leaders.

Israel and the Yom Kippur war (October 1973)

- Issue salient \rightarrow territory.
- Significant risks of reputation costs.
- Israel "won" the war (military perspective).

Political ramifications

Getmansky and Weiss (2020)

- Data: Public opinion and voting record.
- Effects on incumbent support.

Results:

- PM popularity drop by 19%
 Popularity
- 2 Support for incumbent party drop by 10%, opposition party gain 10% increase in support.
- Fatalities and support.

Why do we care so much?









Evolutionary approach (Johnson and Toft 2015)

- Die for a territory, why?
- Territoriality importance of territory (humans and animals).
- Solves the challenges of the environment.
- Survival → maximize "Darwinianatness".
- Proxy to secure access to resources.

Evolutionary approach (Johnson and Toft 2015)

- Behavior → "automatic" physiological and psychological mechanisms.
- Fight for territory not just politics.
- A rational angle (Fearon 1995) indivisible good.
- Explanation for war.
- Example: Jerusalem. AllReligions

Territoriality in Nature

- Territory prevents constant fighting.
- (1) Value asymmetry: "residents" vs. "intruders".
- Familiarity and the edge in conflict.
- Links to loss aversion, SQ bias.
- Potential costs \rightarrow strong attachment to homeland.

Territoriality in Nature

- (2) Economic defensibility.
- Spatial distribution of essential goods.
- \bullet Resources centered in one place \to fight over it.

Evolutionary game theory

- The "hawk dove" game.
- "Residents" vs. "Intruders".
- Rational prevention of conflict.

Beyond rationality

- Costs, tangible value and probability of victory.
- The "owner" of the land.
- Expectations of behavior.



Historical Ownership (Fang and Li 2020)

- Historical ownership of territory and wars.
- Indivisible land and escalation of conflicts.
- Historical precedents → opportunity and incentives.

Strength of claim

- Legitimacy history ≫ ethnic ties and resources.
- Legality property rights.
- Emotional ties.

Historical Ownership claims

Ties to the land

- Disputed territory \rightarrow indivisible ("zero-sum" outcome).
- Support coercive measures: economic sanctions and military action.
- The power of nationalism.
- Loss of land as a threat on national identity.



Historical Ownership and conflict

Public Views (Fang and Li 2020)

- Method: experiment in China.
- Territory, history and nationalism.

Findings

- High support for "zero-sum" solution.
- Lower support for compromise when historical claim.

▶ Compromise


No evidence for nationalism effect.

Motivations for Disputes

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Historical Ownership in China

Effects on policy solutions



Spatial Proximity (Tanaka 2016)

- Public views of territorial disputes.
- Spatial distance → incentives for compromise.
- Variations in proximity to territory at stake.
- Public opinion changes.

Spatial Proximity (Tanaka 2016)

- Ties to the territory and proximity.
- Close → costs of conflict.
- Favor compromise.
- Distant → importance and ties to territory.
- Oppose compromise.
- ullet Security threat o no effect for proximity.

Spatial Proximity (Tanaka 2016)

- Test: Japan contested islands (Korea and China).
- compromise (with monetary compensation) or dispute.

Results

- Greater opposition to compromise.
- ullet Compromise and reputation costs o strong opposition.
- Economic benefits → support compromise for close proximity.

Motivations for disputes

- Tangible value resources, strategic advantage.
- Intangible value history, ideology, biology.
- ullet Rational view o costs of control vs. concessions
- Outside effect credible commitment to agreement.
- ullet Ideology and identity o collective identity and homeland.
- Ethnicity or religiosity and strong bonds with land.
- Costs \rightarrow less powerful than control over land.

Tangible and intangible values (Manekin et al. 2019)

- Context the West bank and Israeli citizens views.
- Explore the foundations of territorial disputes.
- Survey experiments (2014-2017)

TABLE 1 Experimental Design: Example

	Policy A	Policy B
Territory	Israel will significantly strengthen its territorial control in the West Bank	Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem
Security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged
Economy	Israel's economy will be severely harmed	Israel's economy will grow significantly
Budget	The security, education, and health budgets will remain in their present form	The security budget will decrease, and the education and health budgets will increase

Tangible and intangible values (Manekin et al. 2019)

budgets:

(Baseline = The security, education, and health budgets will remain unchanged)
The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase
The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease:

economy:

(Baseline = The economy will remain unchanged) Israel's economy will be severely harmed Israel's economy will grow significantly

security:

(Baseline = Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged)
Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly

Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly territory:

(Baseline = Israel will significantly strengthen its territorial control in the West Bank) Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem

budgets:

(Baseline = The security, education, and health budgets will remain unchanged)
The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase
The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease

(Baseline = The economy will remain unchanged)
Israel's economy will be severely harmed

Israel's economy will grow significantly


security:

(Baseline = Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged)

Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly

territory

(Baseline = Israel will significantly strengthen its territorial control in the West Bank) Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, but not from East Jerusalem Israel will withdraw from the territories of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem



Tangible values for contested territory


Salient Issue OtherVoters

Right

Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)

Give territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)


Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else bad)



Predicted values

Costs, risks and concessions

Terrorism risk (right-wing voters)




Percent of concessions' success in reducing terrorism

More studies on territorial disputes:


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Territorial Wars and public opinion




Extra Material

Indivisible Territory



Quick review




Tangible values for contested territory

Center



Give territory, including Jerusalem (all else good)

Keep territory, including Jerusalem (all else bad)



Predicted values