POLS 318: Theories of IR Lecture 19 (03.24.2021): Audience Costs: The Public Angle

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## Overview

- Quick review
- 2 Audience Costs theory
- 3 Deeper Dive
- Multiple Inconsistencies
- 5 Extra Material

#### What we covered last meeting?

- The political costs of backing down from promises.
- Strategic angle democracies and credible threats.
- Why costs? reputation, honor and credibility.
- The observation problem.
- The measure of crisis reciprocation.
- Beyond democracies dictator have audience as well.

Questions?? Email me!

## **Audience Costs**

### Main Challenge

- How can we 'view' audience costs?
- Strategic state behavior.
- Measures → reciprocation in conflict.
- The public fundamental element in AC...
- Do citizens matter in IR? How?

## **Audience Costs**

## Tomz (2007)

- Test public opposition to leaders' empty threats.
- Do citizens reject inconsistent behavior by leaders?
- Evidence for microfoundations of IR behavior.
- Method: experiment (isolate causal effect inconsistency).
- Factors:
  - Regime type.
  - Motivation for attack.
  - Power relations with the US.
  - Interests at stake.

## Tomz (2007)

	Public reaction to empty threat – (%)	Public reaction to staying out = (%)	Difference Summary of in opinion (%) (%)
Disapprove			
Disapprove very strongly	31 (27 to 35)	20 (17 to 23)	11 (6 to 17) 16
Disapprove somewhat	18 (14 to 21)	13 (10 to 16)	$ \begin{array}{c} 11 \\ (6 \text{ to } 17) \\ 5 \\ (0 \text{ to } 9) \end{array} $ $ \begin{array}{c} 16 \\ (10 \text{ to } 22) \end{array} $
Neither			
Lean toward disapproving	8 (6 to 11)	9 (7 to 11)	$\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ (-3 \text{ to } 3) \end{pmatrix}$
Don't lean either way	21 (17 to 24)	21 (18 to 24)	$ \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ (-3 \text{ to } 3) \\ 0 \\ (-5 \text{ to } 4) \\ -3 \end{pmatrix} $ $ \begin{pmatrix} -4 \\ (-9 \text{ to } 2) \end{pmatrix} $
Lean toward approving	8 (6 to 11)	11 (9 to 14)	$ \begin{array}{c} -3 \\ (-6 \text{ to } 0) \end{array} $
Approve			
Approve somewhat	8 (5 to 10)	13 (11 to 16)	$\begin{pmatrix} -6 \\ (-9 \text{ to } -2) \end{pmatrix}$ -12
Approve very strongly	6 (4 to 9)	13 (10 to 16)	$   \begin{array}{c}     -6 \\     (-9 \text{ to } -2) \\     -7 \\     (-10 \text{ to } -3)   \end{array}   \begin{cases}     -12 \\     (-17 \text{ to } -8)   \end{cases} $

#### LEVEL OF ESCALATION

Level of escalation	Absolute audience cost (%)	Relative risk of disapproval (%)
Threat of force	16	1.5
	(10 to 22)	(1.3 to 1.7)
Display of force	16	1.5
	(10 to 22)	(1.3 to 1.7)
Use without U.S. casualties	23	1.7
	(16 to 29)	(1.5 to 2.0)
Use with U.S. casualties	32	2.0
	(26 to 39)	(1.7 to 2.3)

### Tomz (2007)


#### More elements

- Overall → disapproval for backing-down.
- Less criticism for 'stay-out' option.
- Stronger effect for politically engaged.


### Why reject backing-down?

- 'Right thing to do'.
- Credibility, reputation.

## POLS 318 & Audience Costs



## POLS 318 & Audience Costs



### Levendusky and Horowitz (2012)

- Explore the situation and effects on AC.
- ullet Focus o domestic political conditions.
- How changes the extent of audience costs?

#### (1) Elite reactions

- Opposition  $\rightarrow$  view of resolve.
- Elites, info advantage and signal for public.
- Split vs. consensus to president's actions.

### (2) Partisanship

- Political affiliation and criticism on leader.
- Security crisis as immediate threat.
- Framing by president the national interest.

### (3) Justification

- How new information changes views?
- Information to justify backing-down.
- Competent leader  $\rightarrow$  reduced costs.


## **Audience Costs**

### Information and domestic politics


#### Main results:

- Effects on approval of president. Approval
- New information and elite views affect public opinion.
- Partisanship has limited effect.
- Reputation and incompetence.
- The process of AC formation.

# Finding audience costs: POLS 318




# Finding audience costs: POLS 318



## Audience costs: POLS 318

#### Inconsistency - Negative effects



# **Probing Inconsistency**

#### More than backing-down

- ullet Empty threat o reputation and credibility costs.
- Backing-In??

#### Fort Sumter April-June 1861






# Compare Inconsistent actions

### Back-down vs. Back-in (Levy et al. 2015)

- Consistency → foundation of AC.
- Domestic costs for failure to honor promise to 'stay-out'.
- Game setting expand the 'stay-out' node:
  - Remain out.
  - Backing in: intervene and break promise.

### Back-down and Back-in



### Back-down and Back-in

#### Results

- Inconsistency and growing audience costs.
- New information.
- Rewarding the leader for 'backing-out'.
- Small punishment for 'backing-in'.
- Competence, reputation and credibility.

# Inconsistency and the public

### Kertzer and Brutger (2016)

- Extend debate on costs of inconsistency.
- Punishment for initial intervention decision.
- The 'belligerence costs' (a sunk cost).
- The two elements of audience costs.

## A double barreled gun

#### Belligerence costs:

- Citizens oppose using force in IR.
- Fears of escalation, isolationist views.

#### **Heterogeneous Audience**

- Different views of AC elements.
- Public characteristics matter for signal of resolve.

# Audience costs and public


### **Heterogeneous Audience**

- Military assertiveness.
- International trust.
- Nationalism.
- Political ideology.

#### Results

- Backing down and approval ratings.
- Decompose audience costs inconsistency (67%) and belligerence (33%).

# Decompose audience costs and public



# Recommended readings

#### More studies on audience costs:

- Schwartz, Joshua A., and Christopher W. Blair. "Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining." International Organization (2020): 1-24.
- Li, Xiaojun, and Dingding Chen. "Public opinion, international reputation, and audience costs in an authoritarian regime." Conflict Management and Peace Science (2018).
- Weiss, Jessica Chen, and Allan Dafoe. "Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China." International Studies Quarterly 63.4 (2019): 963-973.

# President Approval

